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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union. R. at 1. The
district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the case
because the issues arise under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006), a law of the United States, and federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action
arising under the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2006). The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has proper jurisdiction to hear appeals from any final decision of the United States District Court for the District of New
Union. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether New Union has standing to bring this case either
under its sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of its
groundwater or its parens patriae capacity as protector of its citizens’ interests in the groundwater when New Union has alleged
that it and its citizens will suffer injuries due to the pollution of
the Imhoff Aquifer, which is located beneath New Union.
Whether Lake Temp is a “navigable water” as defined under
the CWA when it is an intermittent body of water that contains
water four out of every five years, and there is evidence that interstate travelers use Lake Temp for hunting, bird watching, and
boating.
Whether the correct agency to issue the permit in this case is
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) under CWA § 404 because the slurry is a fill material due to its effect on the bottomlevel elevation of Lake Temp or the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) under CWA § 402 because the slurry is a pollutant
due to its contents, which include munitions and other hazardous
chemicals.
Whether the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) violated the CWA when it instructed the EPA not to exercise its explicit veto power under CWA § 402(c) to invalidate the COE’s
permit.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of New Union filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Union seeking review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006), of an individual permit issued by the COE to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to discharge a slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp. R. at 3. New Union alleged that the EPA,
not the COE, was the proper agency to issue the permit, and because the EPA had not done so, the DOD’s permit was invalid. R.
at 3. The State of Progress, where the permitted activities will
take place, intervened in the lawsuit. R. at 3.
After discovery, the Secretary of the Army, representing the
United States, filed a motion for summary judgment, to which
both New Union and Progress responded with cross-motions for
summary judgment. R. at 5. On June 2, 2011, the district court
granted the Secretary’s motion and denied New Union’s. R. at 10.
The court held that: (1) New Union did not have standing to bring
its claim; (2) the COE was the appropriate agency to issue the
permit because Lake Temp is a navigable water and the slurry to
be discharged is a fill material; and (3) OMB’s involvement in the
process did not violate the CWA. R. at 10-11.
New Union and Progress each filed a Notice of Appeal. R. at
1. New Union appeals the district court’s holding that New Union lacked standing to bring its claim. R. at 1. New Union also
appeals the court’s finding that the slurry is a fill material, arguing that the slurry is a pollutant and thus required a permit from
the EPA rather than the COE. R. at 1. New Union also takes issue with the court’s holding that the OMB’s involvement was
proper. R. at 1. Progress appeals only the court’s holding that
Lake Temp is a navigable water. R. at 1. This Court granted review on September 15, 2011. R. at 2.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The DOD has a plan in place to receive and prepare a variety
of munitions for discharge into Lake Temp, a body of water located in Progress. The DOD must secure a proper permit from a
federal agency before it can implement its plan. The reason for
New Union’s lawsuit is its concern that the contents of the dis-
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charge will contaminate an aquifer that is located beneath New
Union. New Union’s appeal is grounded in this same concern.
The Lake and its Visitors
Lake Temp is an oval-shaped body of water that is three
miles wide and nine miles long at its high-water mark. R. at 3-4.
Although the lake becomes much smaller during the dry seasons,
it does contain water four out of every five years. R. at 4. Its
boundaries are wholly within Progress, but almost one thousand
feet below Lake Temp lies the Imhoff Aquifer, which is located
beneath both Progress and New Union. R. at 4. The land between
the lake and the aquifer is primarily unconsolidated alluvial fill,
so the contents of the lake eventually filter into the aquifer. R. at
5.
Residents of Progress, New Union, and other states use Lake
Temp for a variety of reasons. R. at 4. For example, people take
rowboats and canoes to the lake to hunt and bird watch. R. at 4.
Interstate hunters in particular have hunted from boats and canoes on the lake as well as navigated across the lake by rowing or
paddling to hunt from its different shores. R. at 7. Dale Bompers,
a resident of New Union, lives on a ranch above the Imhoff Aquifer, and although he does not presently use the aquifer, he could
do so if he applied for a withdrawal permit from the New Union
Department of Natural Resources. R. at 6. The Department
would give Mr. Bompers a preference should he apply for such a
permit, as he is an owner of land located directly above the
groundwater. R. at 6.
The Department of Defense’s Pollution Plan
The DOD plans to construct a facility to receive and prepare
a wide variety of munitions for discharge into Lake Temp. R. at 4.
The munitions will be combined with liquid, semi-solid, and
granular contents to ensure that they are not explosive before being discharged. R. at 4. Along with the inherent dangers of the
munitions, the contents they are to be combined with also include
many chemicals that are on the CWA § 311’s list of hazardous
materials. R. at 4. The DOD will then spray the dry portions of
the lake with this slurry, eventually covering the entire lakebed
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and raising the lake’s top water elevation by approximately six
feet. R. at 4. The process will take several years to complete, after which Lake Temp should return to its pre-operation condition,
albeit at a higher elevation. R. at 4-5. There is no evidence, however, that the slurry will not cause any harmful effects to either
Lake Temp or the Imhoff Aquifer. R. at 4.
The Permit Process and the Office of Management and
Budget’s Interference
Before the DOD can begin its project, it must secure a permit
to discharge materials into Lake Temp from either the COE or
the EPA. R. at 7-8. The COE classified the slurry in this case to
be a fill material, so it issued an individual permit to the DOD
under § 404 of the CWA. R. at 8. The EPA, however, disagreed
with the COE’s characterization of the slurry, as it found the nature of the discharge would require a permit from the EPA under
§ 402 of the CWA because the slurry was a pollutant, not a fill
material. R. at 9. But before the EPA could exercise its right to
veto the COE’s permit, the OMB interfered with the process and
directed the EPA not to do so. R. at 9. The EPA took no further
action after receiving this instruction from the OMB. R. at 9.
New Union is concerned with the potential ramifications of
the DOD’s project, for it believes the discharge of munitions and
chemicals into Lake Temp will eventually pollute the Imhoff Aquifer, thereby injuring both New Union’s and its residents’ interests in the groundwater. R. at 6. New Union therefore filed this
lawsuit in an effort to have the appropriate agency, the EPA, review the proposed project and ensure that the appropriate permit
and review process is used before the DOD begins discharging potential pollutants into Lake Temp. R. at 3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case involves an appeal from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). Therefore, the issues before this Court are questions of law
and should be reviewed de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
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552, 557 (1988). Accordingly, this Court should afford no deference to the opinions and conclusions of the lower court. See id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in holding that New Union did not
have standing, that the COE had jurisdiction to issue a § 404
permit, and that the OMB’s dispute resolution between the EPA
and the COE did not violate the CWA. In particular, New Union
does have standing to bring its claims as owner and regulator of
its groundwater and under its parens patriae capacity as the protector of its citizens’ rights in the state’s groundwater. Furthermore, although the district court was correct in holding that Lake
Temp is a navigable water, it erred in concluding that the COE
was the appropriate agency to issue the permit because the slurry
in this case is a pollutant, not a fill material. Finally, the district
court erred when it found that the OMB’s involvement in this
case was proper because Congress did not provide the OMB with
the power to direct the EPA on whether to exercise the EPA’s
rights under the CWA.
The district court erred in holding that New Union did not
have standing. The court found that New Union could not show
that it would suffer any actual or imminent injury as a result of
the DOD’s proposed plan. But New Union explicitly pointed out
its injury: the pollution of the Imhoff Aquifer, which is located
beneath New Union. New Union also relies on the relaxed standing test the Supreme Court proffered in Massachusetts v. EPA,
wherein affected states are subject to a more favorable test for
standing if they can allege an injury to their sovereign interests.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). New Union has done
so, alleging an injury to its sovereign interest as the protector and
regulator of its groundwater.
Alternatively, even if this Court disagrees that New Union
has standing under the Massachusetts test, New Union still has
standing in its representative capacity under the parens patriae
doctrine. Under that doctrine, a state has an interest in protecting its citizens from the pollution of the state’s air and interstate
waters. Here, New Union has a specific interest in protecting its
citizens from the pollution of the Imhoff Aquifer. The state’s in-
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terest is exemplified by Mr. Bompers, who owns and operates a
ranch above the aquifer but would not be able to use the groundwater if it becomes contaminated with the DOD’s slurry.
New Union, however, does not take issue with all of the district court’s holdings. The court was correct in holding that Lake
Temp is a navigable water and thus discharges into the lake require a permit under the CWA. Congress meant for the term
“navigable water” to have a very broad meaning; in fact, the main
purpose of the CWA has nothing to do with navigability. Instead,
the term is meant to cover all the waters of the United States,
and Lake Temp qualifies as a navigable water under either of the
tests established by the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Lake Temp meets Justice Scalia’s
test as a “relatively permanent body of water” because it contains
water much more often than not, is used in interstate commerce,
and is very different from the waters that the Court determined
were not navigable waters in Solid Waste Authority of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Lake Temp also
qualifies as a navigable water under Justice Kennedy’s test,
which requires the body of water to have a significant nexus to a
water of the United States. As Lake Temp is navigable-in-fact, it
necessarily has a sufficient nexus to navigable waters to qualify
under this test.
Although the court was correct in holding that discharge into
the lake would require a permit, it erred in determining that the
COE, and not the EPA, was the correct agency to issue this permit. The court found the slurry in this case to be a fill material,
rather than a pollutant. This determination was in error because
the slurry is a pollutant, not a fill material. First, the slurry contains munitions and hazardous chemicals, both categories of materials that are included in the CWA’s definition of a “pollutant”
but missing from the statute’s definition of a “fill material.” And
second, classifying the slurry as a fill material rather than a pollutant would be contrary to the intent of the CWA. Congress’
goal in enacting the CWA was to maintain the physical, chemical,
and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. Allowing the DOD
to discharge munitions and other hazardous material into Lake
Temp would not maintain the integrity of the lake; allowing the
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DOD to continue with its project without the proper permit from
the EPA would compromise the integrity of the CWA.
Finally, the district court erred in holding that the OMB’s involvement in this case was proper. The EPA was preparing to veto the COE’s issuance of the permit to the DOD on the basis that
the slurry contained materials that required a permit for the discharge of pollutants. But the OMB interfered with the process
and instructed the EPA not to exercise its right. The CWA explicitly gives the EPA the right to veto the COE’s decision, but it does
not give any other agency the power to interfere with the EPA’s
decisions. Furthermore, when the EPA decided not to take any
further action, its decision was contrary to Congress’ original intent in enacting the CWA. The Supreme Court held in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC that the judicial branch must reverse administrative constructions that run contrary to Congress’ clear
intentions with enacting statutes. Here, if the EPA does not veto
the COE’s issuance of the permit, it will be acting contrary to
Congress’ clear intent, which is to maintain the integrity of the
nation’s waters. Allowing the DOD to proceed with its COEissued permit when the slurry contains munitions and hazardous
materials would severely compromise Lake Temp’s integrity and
essentially negate Congress’ intent in enacting the CWA.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE OF NEW UNION HAS STANDING
TO CHALLENGE THE PERMIT IN ITS
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY AS OWNER AND
REGULATOR OF ITS GROUNDWATER AND IN
ITS PARENS PATRIAE CAPACITY AS THE
PROTECTOR OF ITS CITIZENS’ RIGHTS IN
THE STATE’S GROUNDWATER.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power
of the federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2. Plaintiffs must meet several elements to satisfy the
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part” of this requirement. See id. To establish standing, a plaintiff must prove
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(1) it has suffered an injury-in-fact (2) that is causally connected
to the defendant’s alleged conduct and (3) that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61. New Union has established that it has standing under the two theories of standing
available to states as plaintiffs. First, New Union has standing in
its sovereign capacity under the “special solicitude” analysis established by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007). Second, New Union has standing under its
“right [as] a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair
harm to its ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests.” Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). Thus, this Court should reverse the district court’s holding and find that New Union has established standing sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article
III.
a. New Union has standing in its sovereign capacity
because it is entitled to special solicitude in the
standing analysis given its procedural right to bring
this claim and its stake in protecting its quasisovereign interests.
The Supreme Court has held that a state is entitled to “special solicitude . . . in [the] standing analysis” when it has a procedural right to bring its claim and it seeks to protect a stake in its
quasi-sovereign interests. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. Congress has accorded New Union such a procedural right under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). And New Union is asserting a stake in its quasi-sovereign “interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain.” Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
Therefore, New Union need only pass the relaxed test established
by Massachusetts v. EPA to have standing in this action.
To meet the Article III requirement of standing, “a litigant
must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
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at 517 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61). A litigant in whom Congress has vested a procedural right to protect
his interests, however, “can assert that right without meeting all
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. at 572 n.7). Such a litigant would have “standing if there is
some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injurycausing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed
the litigant.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (citing Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). New Union is such a litigant because Congress vested in it the procedural right to seek judicial
review of an agency’s action, and the DOD would at a minimum
have to reconsider its implementation of its plan if this Court
were to grant New Union’s requested relief. Therefore, New Union needs to establish only the injury requirement to have standing in this case.
New Union has shown that the agency action will cause an
imminent injury to the state. An injury sufficient to establish
standing must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (stating the injury must be
“real and immediate”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158
(1990) (stating the injury must be “certainly impending”). The
Supreme Court, however, established that a fairly attenuated injury could still establish standing with its holding in United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973). In that case, an environmental group asked
the Court to enjoin the enforcement of Interstate Commerce
Commission orders allowing railroads to collect a surcharge on
freight rates. Id. at 678. The plaintiffs argued that
a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of
nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus
resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce
such goods, some of which resources might be taken from the
Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the Washington area.

Id. at 688. The Court admitted that the plaintiffs’ line of causation to the eventual injury was attenuated, but it nonetheless
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held that the plaintiffs had shown an injury sufficient to establish
standing. See id.
Here, New Union’s injury is much less attenuated, so it necessarily is sufficient to establish standing. Portions of the Imhoff
Aquifer are located within New Union’s boundaries. R. at 4. New
Union has provided evidence that the contaminated water from
Lake Temp will enter the aquifer and consequently contaminate
its waters “because the land between the lakebed and the aquifer
is primarily unconsolidated alluvial fill.” R. at 5. As the Supreme
Court held in Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., a state has an interest
in “all the earth and air within its domain.” 206 U.S. at 237.
Therefore, New Union at least has an interest in keeping its portion of the aquifer uncontaminated.
Furthermore, New Union has provided sufficient proof of its
injury to establish its standing. To invoke federal jurisdiction,
“each element must be supported in the same way as any other
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with
the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
This case is at the summary judgment stage. R. at 5. At this
stage, “the plaintiff . . . must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken as true.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. at 561 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“At the summary judgment stage, facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . .”).
Thus, New Union need only point to specific facts that support its injury to establish standing, and it has done so. The Secretary of the Army may claim that New Union should provide
more proof for its allegations, but at this stage of the litigation,
New Union is not required to provide the type of evidence that
would be required at trial. Cf. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 (1979) (At the trial stage, the facts
necessary to establish standing must be “supported adequately by
the evidence adduced at trial.”). The Secretary of the Army may
further argue that New Union must drill and sample from a grid
of monitoring wells to establish the necessary proof of its injury,
but again, at this stage, New Union only has to point out that the

11

56 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 3
pollutants from the permitted activity will contaminate the aquifer to establish its injury. New Union has done so. R. at 5.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the lower court and hold
that New Union has standing to bring its claim.
b. New Union has standing in its parens patriae
capacity to protect its citizens against pollution of
the Imhoff Aquifer, an interstate water system in
which the state has rights.
Even if this Court were to disagree that New Union has
standing because of an injury to its sovereign interests, the Court
should still uphold New Union’s standing as a result of its parens
patriae capacity. “‘Parens patriae’ means ‘parent of his or her
country,’ and refers to . . . the state in its capacity as provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Steele v. Hamilton Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 19 n.5 (Ohio
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1376 (2001); see also Estados
Unidos Mexicanos v. Decoster, 229 F.3d 332, 336 n.3 (1st Cir.
2000) (stating that a state’s interest under the doctrine of parens
patriae “is distinct from its sovereign interest in protecting and
maintaining its boundaries and its proprietary interest in owning
land or conducting a business venture.”). Under the parens patriae doctrine, a state can sue to protect its citizens against pollution of the air over its territory or of the interstate waters in
which the state has rights. See Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns,
Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, New Union is suing to protect its citizens like Dale Bompers from the pollution of
its groundwater, particularly the Imhoff Aquifer.
New Union is suing to protect not only the rights of its citizens but also its own quasi-sovereign interests. The Supreme
Court has recognized the right of a state to sue as parens patriae
but only if the state can also articulate an interest separate from
the interests of private parties. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. P.R., ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). In Alfred L.
Snapp, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued in parens patriae
to challenge what it considered to be discrimination toward its
citizens by east coast apple growers in their employment practices. Id. at 594-95. The Court held that Puerto Rico had standing
in its parens patriae capacity because it was representing its citi-
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zens’ interests along with its quasi-sovereign interest in the mental, physical, and economic well-being of its citizens. Id. at 608.
In addition, the Supreme Court has long recognized that a
“state is entitled to seek relief [when] the matters complained of
affect her citizens at large.” Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 237
(1901). Other courts have also expressly held that a state can sue
in parens patriae to protect its citizenry from damage to the
state’s groundwater. See New Hampshire v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d
212, 215 (N.H. 2011) (holding that a state can sue to recover
damages to its groundwater under parens patriae); United States
v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 739 F. Supp. 125, 132
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the state of New York could sue on
behalf of the general public as the trustee of the natural resources
of the state, including its groundwater). The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in particular, has stated there is no doubt that
states manage the public waters within their borders as trustees
for their people and are thus authorized to institute lawsuits to
protect those waters on the people’s behalf. New Mexico v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006).
Similarly, New Union is suing to protect its citizens’ interests, exemplified by Dale Bompers, and its own quasi-sovereign
interests in the economic well-being of its citizens. Dale Bompers
owns, operates, and lives on a ranch located above the Imhoff Aquifer. R. at 6. The contamination of the aquifer would lower the
property value of his land, causing him economic harm. R. at 6.
New Union’s quasi-sovereign interest in the economic well-being
of its citizens establishes its standing to sue as Bompers’ representative to maintain his property’s value.
Furthermore, New Union also has an interest in protecting
its interstate waters from pollution because it could affect the
physical health of New Union’s citizens. As the Tenth Circuit
held in Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., a state has
the right to sue under parens patriae to protect its citizens from
the pollution of the state’s waters. 7 F.3d at 1469. The pollution
of the aquifer would essentially prohibit Bompers from ever using
the groundwater in any capacity, and if he were ever to use the
aquifer, it could adversely affect his health. New Union’s interest
in protecting Bompers, and citizens like him, is sufficient to establish its standing under the parens patriae doctrine. Therefore,

13
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this Court should reverse the district court’s holding and hold
that New Union has standing to bring its claim.

II.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S PLAN TO
DISCHARGE SLURRY INTO LAKE TEMP
REQUIRES A PERMIT UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT BECAUSE LAKE TEMP IS A
NAVIGABLE WATER.

The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge dredged or fill material into navigable waters without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(a), 1342(a) (2006). The CWA defines “navigable waters” as
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). The COE defines “waters of the United States” as, essentially, “[a]ll waters which are currently used,
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate
or foreign commerce . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2011). The DOD
must obtain a proper permit under the CWA to discharge its proposed slurry into Lake Temp because its susceptibility to use in
interstate commerce makes it a navigable water. First, Lake
Temp is the type of water that Congress intended the term to
cover, and it differs from the disputed waters in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC]. Second, Lake Temp
meets both of the tests proffered by Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
Therefore, this Court should affirm the lower court’s decision and
hold that the DOD was required to obtain a permit for this project
because Lake Temp is a navigable water under the CWA.
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a. Lake Temp is a navigable water given Congress’
broad intentions for the term and the lake’s
dissimilarities from the disputed waters at issue in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.
Prior to the enactment of the CWA, courts interpreted the
phrase “navigable waters” to refer to interstate waters that were
“navigable in fact” or readily susceptible of being rendered so,
meaning that the waters could be used as interstate highways.
See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,
406 (1940); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870). But by enacting
the CWA and defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the
United States,” Congress expressed its intention for the term to
have a broader meaning than that used in ordinary language.
See 118 Cong. Rec. 9124-25 (Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell) (“It means all ‘the waters of the United States’ in a geographical sense. It does not mean ‘navigable waters of the United
States’ in the technical sense as we sometimes see in some
laws.”). The report accompanying the proposed bill explicitly
stated that the House Committee “fully intend[ed] that the term
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.”
H.R. Rep. No. 91-911, at 131 (1972).
Furthermore, Congress specifically opted to broaden the definition of navigable water when it defined the term in the CWA.
The original version of the CWA adopted by the House of Representatives defined “navigable waters” as “the navigable waters of
the United States . . . .” H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. § 502(8) (1971)
(emphasis added). But when Congress passed the final version of
the CWA, it had deleted the word “navigable” from the definition,
ultimately defining the term as simply “the waters of the United
States.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1972); see also SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 181 n.7 (emphasis added). This deletion indicates that
“the goals of the 1972 statute have nothing to do with navigation
at all.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 181.
In fact, the goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). Progress relies on Justice Scalia’s opin-
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ion in Rapanos and the majority’s opinion in SWANCC to urge
this Court to place too much significance on the word “navigable.”
But Congress itself was not concerned with navigability when it
passed the CWA; its major concern was the pollution of the nation’s waters. See id. For that reason, Congress chose not to limit
navigable waters in any way other than to define them as the
“waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). Courts
have since upheld the COE’s broad interpretations of the term
and generally found the COE’s jurisdiction to extend to a great
many of the United States’ waters, even “waters” that are not
navigable in any traditional sense. See, e.g., United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997) (classifying a storm sewer
that wastewater was emptied into as navigable water); United
States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding a
stream that supported trout and beaver and that was used for agricultural irrigation, but was not navigable in fact or used to
transport goods or materials, to be navigable water).
The Supreme Court has agreed that this broad interpretation
is commensurate with Congress’ intentions. The Court first discussed the definition of navigable waters in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., when it addressed an action brought
by the COE to enjoin an owner of wetlands from filling them
without the permission of the COE. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). The
Court was hesitant to extend the term to cover wetlands, stating
“it is one thing to recognize that Congress intended to allow regulation of waters that might not satisfy traditional tests of navigability; it is another to assert that Congress intended to abandon
traditional notions of ‘waters’ and include in that term ‘wetlands’
as well.” Id. at 133. Nonetheless, the Court held that it was reasonable for the COE to interpret the term to encompass “wetlands
adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined” given the “evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water
quality and aquatic ecosystems.” Id. The Court even went so far
as to state that “the term ‘navigable’ as used in the Act is of limited import.” Id. (emphasis added).
Progress relies on the Court’s interpretation of navigable water in its two cases since Riverside, SWANCC and Rapanos, to argue that Lake Temp is not a navigable water. But neither of
these cases requires such a holding. In SWANCC, the Court de-
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clined to extend the COE’s jurisdiction to abandoned sand and
gravel pits in northern Illinois that provided habitats for migratory birds. 531 U.S. at 162. In particular, the Court concluded
that the CWA did not support the COE’s “Migratory Bird Rule,”
which had extended the COE’s jurisdiction to waters “[w]hich are
or would be used as [a] habitat by . . . migratory birds which cross
state lines.” Id. at 164. The Court further explained that Riverside was not applicable to the case before it because in Riverside,
the Court was informed by “the significant nexus between the
wetlands and ‘navigable waters.’” Id. at 167. There was no such
nexus between the pits in SWANCC and any navigable waters, so
the Court held the pits were not navigable waters. See id.
There is also no nexus between the pits in SWANCC and
Lake Temp. The disputed waters in SWANCC were “a scattering
of permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size (from under onetenth of an acre to several acres) and depth (from several inches
to several feet).” Id. at 163. Lake Temp is not a scattering of
small ponds: it is a lake. R. at 3. At its high-water mark, it is
three miles wide and nine miles long. R. at 3-4. The Court held
the ponds in SWANCC to not be navigable waters because they
had no significant nexus to navigable waters; Lake Temp is itself
a navigable water, so its nexus could not be any more significant.
Moreover, in SWANCC, the COE had to rely on its selfpropagated Migratory Bird Rule to establish jurisdiction. 531
U.S. at 164. In this case, the COE need not rely on that overruled
regulation: Lake Temp is used not only by migratory birds, but
also by interstate travelers for hunting and bird watching. R. at
4. Therefore, the disputed waters in SWANCC are not so similar
to Lake Temp as to require the same result, and this Court
should uphold the lower court’s determination that Lake Temp is
a navigable water.
b. Lake Temp also qualifies as a navigable water
under either test promulgated in Rapanos v. United
States because it is a relatively permanent body of
water and is navigable in the traditional sense.
The second case Progress relies on to dispute Lake Temp’s
qualification as a navigable water is Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006). Rapanos resulted in a fractured opinion,
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with a plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia, a dissent authored by Justice Stevens, and a concurrence in the judgment
from Justice Kennedy. See id. Determining which holding is the
controlling opinion of the Supreme Court in Rapanos is a difficult
task. “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). The
circuit courts that have applied Rapanos have differed as to
which opinion, Justice Scalia’s or Justice Kennedy’s, is the narrowest ground and thus the controlling opinion. Compare United
States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Kennedy’s), and N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d
993 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying Kennedy’s), and United States v.
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying
Kennedy’s), with United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.
2006) (applying Scalia’s). In fact, there is no need to determine
which test is the appropriate test for this Court to correctly label
Lake Temp: the lake is a navigable water under either Justice
Scalia’s or Justice Kennedy’s analysis.
Under the plurality’s test in Rapanos, “the phrase ‘the waters
of the United States’ includes only those relatively permanent,
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as
‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes . . .’” and “only those
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are
‘waters of the United States’ in their own right.” Rapanos, 547
U.S. at 739 (emphases added). Lake Temp does not need to meet
the latter criterion because it meets the former.
Lake Temp is a relatively permanent body of water. The
word “relatively” means “in relation, comparison, or proportion to
something else.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882
(2d ed. 1934). Just as Progress and the majority of the Rapanos
Court insisted that the word “navigable” carries significant
weight, so too does the word “relatively” in Justice Scalia’s definition of a navigable water. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia listed, with
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some incredulity, the types of waters that courts had upheld the
COE’s jurisdiction over:
intermittent flow of surface water through approximately 2.4
miles of natural streams and manmade ditches; a “roadside
ditch” . . .; irrigation ditches and drains . . .; and . . . the “washes
and arroyos” of an “arid development site,” located in the middle
of the desert, through which “water courses . . . during periods of
heavy rain.”

Id. at 727 (citations omitted). All of these examples have one
thing in common: they rarely contain water. See id. Lake Temp is
not similar to these waters, which the Rapanos plurality would
have held to be outside the COE’s jurisdiction. The record does
state that Lake Temp is “wholly dry approximately one out of five
years,” but that necessarily indicates that it contains water four
out of five years. R. at 4. With that description, Lake Temp, relative to the ditches, washes, and arroyos that Justice Scalia would
not qualify as navigable waters, is a relatively permanent body of
water.
Lake Temp is also a larger and more permanent body of water than the waters that at least one federal circuit court held to
be navigable water since the Rapanos decision. In Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, the Ninth Circuit characterized a pond that was created when a rock quarry pit was
filled with water to be a navigable water under the CWA. 496
F.3d at 1000. That pond was only one half mile in length and a
quarter mile in breadth, whereas Lake Temp is many times larger. See id.; R. at 3. There was also no evidence that any people
ever used the pond, whereas Lake Temp receives many visitors
during the wet season for hunting and bird watching. See id.; R.
at 4.
In addition, Lake Temp differs from waters that Justice Scalia sought to exclude from navigable waters because it is also navigable in fact. Its shores contain clearly visible trails that indicate the public uses the lake to hunt, bird watch, and boat. R. at
4. The lower court also found that “interstate hunters . . . have
hunted from boats and canoes on the lake and have rowed or
paddled across the lake to hunt from the shore opposite the high-
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way.” R. at 7. Therefore, Lake Temp qualifies as a navigable water under the plurality’s test in Rapanos.
Additionally, because Lake Temp is navigable in fact, it necessarily meets Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test for navigable waters. This test requires a significant nexus between the
water at issue and a navigable water if the former is not a traditionally navigable water in its own right. See Rapanos, 547 U.S.
at 759. The lower court held Lake Temp to be “within the description of water bodies that have been traditionally held navigable because of use by interstate travelers.” R. at 7. Traditionally, courts held waters to be navigable waters because they were
navigable in fact. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940) (defining navigable waters as those that
could be used as interstate highways); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557 (1870) (defining navigable waters as those waters that allow
vessels to engage in interstate trade). Lake Temp is a traditionally navigable water because the facts indicate that individuals
have used Lake Temp to hunt and bird watch in the past. R. at 7.
The Supreme Court has specifically “held that ‘nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters’ . . . [that do] not ‘actually abu[t] on a
navigable highway’ [are] not included as ‘waters of the United
States.’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 726 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
167-68, 171) (alteration in original). Lake Temp is an isolated
and intrastate water, but it is navigable because interstate hunters have rowed or canoed across it to hunt on its shore opposite
the highway. R. at 3, 7. Furthermore, the closest navigable
highway is less than 100 feet from its shore. R. at 4. Such a body
of water is a navigable water. And as a navigable water, Lake
Temp meets Justice Kennedy’s test; it needs no significant nexus
to a navigable water because it is such a water itself.
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the lower court’s
decision and hold that the DOD was required to obtain a permit
for this project because Lake Temp is a navigable water under
the CWA.
III.
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TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY UNDER § 402 OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT.
Under the CWA, an individual seeking to discharge material
into a navigable water of the United States must apply for a permit to do so from either the COE or the EPA. 33 U.S.C. §§
1344(a), 1342(a) (2006). If the material the individual seeks to
discharge is a fill material, the appropriate agency is the COE.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). If the material is a pollutant, however, the appropriate agency is the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006).
In this case, the DOD is seeking to discharge a wide variety of
munitions and hazardous chemicals into Lake Temp, so the appropriate agency from which DOD must seek its permit is the
EPA. See id. Therefore, this Court should reverse the ruling of
the lower court and hold that the DOD’s § 404 permit for discharging its slurry into Lake Temp is invalid because the COE
was not the appropriate agency to issue the permit.

a. The slurry that the Department of Defense seeks to
discharge in this case is a pollutant, not a fill
material.
Under § 1342(a) of the CWA, an individual seeking a “permit
for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,”
must apply for the permit with the EPA. Id. The CWA defines
“pollutant,” in relevant part, as “munitions, chemical wastes, . . .
[and] rock . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006). An individual seeking a “permit[] . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material . .
.,” however, may apply for the permit with the COE. 33 U.S.C. §
1344(a) (2006). Here, the DOD is seeking to discharge slurry containing munitions, hazardous chemicals, and rock, all listed examples of pollutants, into Lake Temp, and therefore the slurry is
a pollutant requiring a permit from the EPA before the DOD can
discharge it into Lake Temp.
The CWA does not define the term “fill material,” but the
COE and the EPA have agreed on a definition for the term in
their regulations. The two agencies define “fill material” as “ma-
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terial placed in waters of the United States where the material
has the effect of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United
States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any
portion of a water of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2011)
(EPA’s definition); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2011) (COE’s definition).
The agencies list “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and materials used to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United States” as examples of fill
materials. Id. Neither list of examples includes munitions or
hazardous chemicals. See id. The examples listed under the definition of pollutants in the CWA, however, include both munitions
and hazardous chemicals. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
The COE’s definition of a fill material was not always contingent on the effect of the material on the targeted water. Prior to
2002, “the COE’s definition of fill material expressly provided
that fill material did ‘not include any pollutant discharged into
the water primarily to dispose of waste’ . . . .” Kory R. Watson,
Comment, Fill Material Pollution Under the Clean Water Act: A
Need for Legislative Change, 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 335, 345 (2011)
(quoting 35 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2001)). The COE was concerned with
protecting the waters of the United States from pure waste material. See id. But in 2002, amid concerns that the regulations were
overbroad, the COE and the EPA issued new regulations that
changed the analysis of whether a material was a fill material
from a purpose-based test to an effects-based test. See Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129,
31,133 (May 9, 2002) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 and 40
C.F.R. pt. 232). The agencies explained that one of the reasons
for the change in the regulations was to promote consistency in
categorizing discharges as fill materials:
An objective, effects-based standard also helps ensure that discharges with similar environmental effects will be treated in a
similar manner under the regulatory program. The subjective,
purpose-based standard led in some cases to inconsistent treatment of similar discharges, a result which hampers effective implementation of the statute.
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Id. Although the agencies’ reasoning for the change was reasonable in theory, in practice the new definition set up the possibility
of “a grave danger that chemically hazardous [material would] be
permitted as fill material . . .” because of the COE’s strict adherence to the new regulations. Watson, supra, at 345.
The Supreme Court faced an example of that grave danger in
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Council, 557 U.S. 261
(2009). In that case, the COE granted a § 404 permit to a gold
mining company seeking to discharge a slurry of crushed rock
and water from a froth-flotation mill into a lake protected by the
CWA. Id. at 2464. The majority of the Court focused on the effect
of the slurry in determining that it was a fill material, and not a
pollutant, and it upheld the COE’s grant of the permit. Id. at
2463 (holding the slurry to be fill material “because it would have
the effect of raising the lake’s bottom elevation”). The majority
acknowledged there could be extreme cases where the COE’s interpretation would “lead to § 404 permits authorizing the discharges of other solids that are now restricted by EPA standards,”
but it declined to decide that issue because no such extreme instance was before it. Id. at 2468.
The dissent, on the other hand, was very concerned with the
majority’s approach to interpreting the term “fill material.” See
id. at 2483 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent
felt that the majority’s narrow reading would allow “[w]hole categories of regulated industries . . . [to] gain immunity from a variety of pollution-control standards.” Id. (“A discharge of a pollutant,
otherwise prohibited by firm statutory command, becomes lawful
if it contains sufficient solid matter to raise the bottom of a water
body, transformed into a waste disposal facility.”). The dissent
was concerned that the majority’s reading of the regulations and
statute would create a loophole for polluters. See id.
Here, the DOD is attempting to take advantage of that loophole. The DOD claims, and the lower court erroneously agreed,
that its slurry is covered by the majority’s decision in Coeur. R. at
8. But the slurry in Coeur and the slurry in this case are markedly different. The slurry in Coeur consisted solely of crushed rock
and water; the slurry in this case consists of munitions and chemicals, in addition to rock and water. R. at 4. The relevant definitions in the statutes and regulations provide examples of fill ma-
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terial and pollutants, but whereas munitions and chemicals are
not included in the examples of fill material, they are explicitly
included in the examples of pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(2006). Moreover, the chemicals the DOD plans to mix with the
munitions include many chemicals that are on the CWA’s list of
hazardous substances. R. at 4. The slurry in this case is far more
dangerous for the environment than the slurry in Coeur, so the
procedure for obtaining a permit under the CWA for the discharge of such a pollutant requires a permit from the EPA, not
the COE.
b. Labeling the slurry in this case as a fill material
rather than a pollutant is antithetical to the explicit
goal of the Clean Water Act.
More importantly, classifying the slurry in this case as a fill
material flies in the face of the goals of the CWA. The explicit
purpose of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity” of the waters of the United
States. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). The CWA’s drafters stated,
“The use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste treatment
system is unacceptable.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971). The dissenters in Coeur were particularly outraged with the majority’s
decision, explaining that “[t]he use of waters of the United States
as ‘settling ponds’ for harmful mining waste . . . is antithetical to
the text, structure, and purpose of the Clean Water Act.” Coeur,
557 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Similarly, classifying
the discharge of the DOD’s slurry in this case as the discharge of
a fill material would be irreconcilable with the CWA’s stated purpose.
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 with the goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters by 1985.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). In line with that goal, the COE and
EPA initially excluded as fill material any pollutant that was discharged primarily to dispose of waste. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2
(2001). Although the agencies have since changed their technical
definitions of the term, the purpose behind the CWA has not
changed at all. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). The agencies also continue to recognize this purpose, as evidenced by their continued
exclusion of “trash or garbage” from their definitions of fill mate-
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rial. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011). Thus,
even as definitions in the CWA may change, its stated purpose
should continue to guide agencies and courts in their decisions.
The Coeur majority, however, appeared to lose sight of this
purpose. In coming to its decision, the majority ignored the fact
that “the discharge would kill all of the lake’s fish and nearly all
of its other aquatic life.” Coeur, 557 U.S. at 297. The majority also paid little heed as to whether aquatic life could ever inhabit
the lake again. See id. at n.1. Killing all of the aquatic life in a
lake cannot be commensurate with the goal of maintaining a water’s “physical, chemical and biological integrity.” See 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (2006). Such an act is inapposite to the CWA’s goals.
Here, the DOD and the COE have also ignored the CWA’s
stated purpose. Dumping munitions and chemicals, many of
which are among the hazardous substances listed in CWA § 311,
will very likely disrupt Lake Temp’s chemical integrity, if not also
its physical and biological integrity. New Union presented evidence, and neither the parties nor the lower court contested, that
the discharge of the slurry into Lake Temp will contaminate its
waters. R. at 5. The lower court referred unflinchingly to “the
pollution” of the lake when discussing the issue of New Union’s
standing in this case. R. at 5. And the EPA also “argued . . . that
the nature of the discharge here [is] significantly different from
the discharge in Coeur, so as to warrant a different outcome . . . .”
R. at 9. This argument indicates the EPA also believes the slurry
in this case will have a significant impact on the future of Lake
Temp. Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526 (“EPA would presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions reductions
would have no discernable impact on future global warming.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, this Court should reverse the ruling
of the lower court and hold that the DOD’s § 404 permit for discharging into Lake Temp is invalid because the slurry is not a fill
material and classifying it as such would violate the stated purpose of the CWA.
IV.

THE DECISION BY THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET THAT THE
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND NOT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
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HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE PERMIT
IN THIS CASE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT.
The OMB improperly instructed the EPA not to veto the decision of the COE to issue the § 404 permit to the DOD. R. at 9.
The OMB’s interference was a violation of the CWA. R. at 9. The
CWA tasks the Secretary of the Army and the Administrator of
the EPA with interpreting and acting upon the relevant statutes
of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), 1344(a) (2006). The CWA
allocates no such power to the OMB, and the only power it reserves to any party other than the COE or the EPA is the power
it grants the President to grant effluents an exemption from the
statute for up to one year. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006). Not only
was the OMB’s action improper, but also the EPA’s decision not
to veto the COE’s grant of the permit was contrary to the intent
of the CWA. Therefore, this Court should reverse the decision of
the lower court and hold that the OMB’s participation in these
proceedings was improper.
a. Congress did not provide the Office of Management
and Budget with the power to make such a decision.
The United States Constitution requires the President to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” U.S. Const.
art. II, § 3. Under that authority, President Jimmy Carter, in
1978, enacted Executive Order No. 12,088, the purpose of which
was to ensure that all federal, state, and local agencies comply
with federally mandated pollution control standards. 43 Fed. Reg.
47,707 (Oct. 17, 1978). Section 1-602 of that Executive Order
states that “[t]he Administrator [of the EPA] shall make every effort to resolve conflicts regarding [a] violation between Executive
agencies . . . . If the Administrator cannot resolve a conflict, the
Administrator shall request the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to resolve the conflict.” Id. at 47,708. But
the OMB did not simply seek to resolve a conflict in this case; it
directed the EPA not to exercise its veto power over the COE. R.
at 9. This action exceeded the OMB’s authority under Executive
Order No. 12,088.
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The lower court correctly noted that “Congress conferred no
authority directly or indirectly on OMB to issue permits or veto
permits under 33 U.S.C. §§ [402] or [404] or to decide which permit should be issued in any particular instance.” R. at 9. OMB
thus violated the CWA by “directing [the] EPA not to veto the
permit.” R. at 9. The “EPA argued to OMB that the nature of the
discharge here was significantly different from the discharge in
Coeur, so as to warrant a different outcome, requiring a section
402 permit at least for treatment of the non-fill liquid and semisolid portion of the material before discharge to navigable waters.” R. at 9. These facts indicate that the EPA was preparing to
veto the COE’s decision until it was directed not to do so by the
OMB, an improper abrogation of the EPA’s veto power.
b. The decision of the Environmental Protection
Agency to follow the direction of the Office of
Management and Budget and not exercise its veto
power was contrary to Congress’ clear intent with
the Clean Water Act.
Under the direction of the OMB, the EPA then chose not to
veto the COE’s decision, and this decision was also improper. The
EPA’s decision is wholly discretionary, and, as the lower court
correctly noted, “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion
by law” is not subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(2006). The Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
however, stated that the “judiciary is the final authority on issues
of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). Therefore, if the EPA’s decision in this
case was contrary to Congress’ intent with its enactment of the
CWA, this Court should reverse the lower court’s decision.
The EPA’s decision not to exercise its veto power is contrary
to the intent of the CWA. The goal of the statute is the “maintenance of [the] chemical, physical and biological integrity of [the]
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). By not vetoing the
COE’s decision, the EPA is allowing the DOD to discharge pollutants into Lake Temp, thereby compromising the lake’s integrity
and violating the purpose of the CWA. Furthermore, Congress
did not intend for the OMB to interpret and administer the per-

27

72 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 3
mit system under the CWA; it grants those powers only to the
COE and the EPA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1342 (2006). By continuing under the OMB’s direction, the EPA is allowing the OMB
to make a decision that Congress explicitly reserved for the EPA.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006). The EPA expressed to the OMB
that it had reservations about the contents of the slurry, and it
argued that a § 402 permit should be required for at least some of
those contents. R. at 9. If the EPA were to act as Congress intended, it would move forward with its veto power and protect the
waters of the United States from pollution, as the CWA requires.
Instead, the EPA is following the direction of an executive agency
that does not have near the experience that the EPA does in administering the CWA, thereby acting contrary to Congress’ wishes.
The OMB’s inexperience with the CWA and its applications
is more reason why the EPA needs to make its own decision in
this case. When addressing similar situations, the Supreme
Court has refused to grant the OMB authority to overrule an
agency’s decision when Congress has not expressly provided the
OMB with any such reviewing power in the relevant statute. See
Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 39 (1990) (holding that the OMB did not have the power to determine whether
an agency should adopt certain measures when Congress had not
authorized the OMB to do so). One of the reasons that the Court
is reluctant to grant the OMB such authority is the same reason
many scholars argue that the OMB’s involvement in agency decisions should be very limited: the people that make up the OMB
lack the substantive backgrounds to make sufficiently informed
judgments in the fields which they attempt to regulate. See Alan
B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The
Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1066
(1986). These scholars are concerned that “OMB’s small staff,
comprised of economists, lawyers, or public policy analysts, as opposed to scientists, pharmacologists, or doctors, is making decisions about regulations that would require scientific determinations or expert judgments.” Pamela M. Foster, A Limit to OMB’s
Authority Under the Paperwork Reduction Act in Dole v. United
Steelworkers of America: A Step in the Right Direction, 6 Admin.
L.J. Am. U. 153, 168 (1992).
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Here, the OMB is essentially making the determination that
the DOD’s slurry is a fill material and not a pollutant, but it is
the EPA that has the necessary expertise to make such a determination. Allowing the OMB this interference would not only be
contrary to Congress’ intent, it would also allow the OMB to
“abuse its authority at the expense of the public’s well-being.” Id.
at 166 n.116. The OMB has abused its authority before, also in a
way that served to frustrate the purposes of agency regulations
and to ultimately endanger public health and safety. See id. at
153 n.2 (listing examples of when the OMB’s interference with
policymaking has resulted in the endangerment of the public).
This Court should not allow the same to happen here. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the lower court and hold that the
OMB’s participation in these proceedings was improper, and the
EPA should be allowed to veto the COE’s decision.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that New Union has standing to bring
its claims, either under its power to protect its sovereign interests
or its representative capacity under the parens patriae doctrine.
Although the lower court was correct in classifying Lake Temp as
a navigable water, it incorrectly upheld the COE’s jurisdiction to
issue the permit in this case when it determined that the slurry is
a fill material rather than a pollutant. And the OMB’s involvement in the permit process was improper given that Congress
gave only the EPA the power to decide whether the COE’s issuance of a permit under § 404 is proper. For the foregoing reasons,
New Union respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the district court to grant the Secretary of the Army’s motion for summary judgment. This Court should then grant New
Union’s motion for summary judgment.
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